



ما وراء الأزمة

BEYOND THE CRISIS

Optimising Disaster Recovery & Emergency
Operations — Middle East

ABOUT THE FACILITATOR

Sharif Barakat

18+

Years

100+

Engagements

8

Countries

CIA · GRCP · GRCA

ISO 22361 · ISO 31000

Crisis & Disaster Recovery Expert

GRC · Business Continuity · Emergency Operations · Internal Audit

Sharif Barakat is a regional expert in crisis management, disaster recovery and organisational resilience, with over 18 years of field experience across the Middle East, North Africa and the Gulf. He has worked with government institutions, private sector organisations and international entities in eight countries — designing and stress-testing disaster recovery frameworks, building emergency operations centres, and assessing institutional readiness under compound crisis conditions.

Throughout his career, Sharif has led more than 100 advisory engagements spanning enterprise risk management, business continuity management, AML/CFT compliance, internal audit and corporate governance. He has held senior leadership positions at Deloitte Middle East, Ernst & Young and Moore Global.

His technical foundation includes the internationally recognised CIA, GRCP and GRCA certifications, with deep working knowledge of ISO 22301 (Business Continuity), ISO 22361 (Crisis Management) and ISO 31000 (Risk Management) — applied as operational tools in live crisis environments across the region.

AGENDA

Seven parts. Every section grounded in named, dated regional incidents.

01	The Unrest Landscape	<i>Eight conflict theatres, 30-month escalation timeline</i>	JO
02	Hormuz & Red Sea Crisis	<i>Chokepoints, named shipping incidents, freight data</i>	JO
03	Jordan's Operational Exposure	<i>Six infrastructure vulnerabilities, sourced figures</i>	JO
04	Aqaba Deep Dive	<i>Jordan's single point of failure — incident by incident</i>	JO
05	DR Principles & Regional Gaps	<i>What disaster recovery is — and where the region fails</i>	JO
06	Emergency Operations Centres	<i>Structure, four documented failures, optimisation</i>	JO
07	Scenarios, Tools & Reconstruction	<i>Recalibrated scenarios, cyber incidents, closing</i>	JO

PART ONE

The Unrest Landscape

Eight simultaneous conflict theatres — instability without modern precedent

1.1 EIGHT ACTIVE OR ELEVATED-RISK THEATRES — MENA 2024–2026

The operating environment no DR framework in the region was designed for

Country	Status	Category	DR-Relevant Impact	
Gaza / Palestine	ACTIVE	Armed Conflict	36/36 hospitals non-functional at peak (WHO, Nov 2023). Civil infrastructure destroyed. 2.1M displaced.	●
Yemen + Red Sea	ACTIVE	Maritime + Civil	100+ vessels attacked Nov 2023–Jun 2025 (Lloyd's). Aqaba congestion +40%. Global freight +500%.	●
Lebanon	ACTIVE	Armed Conflict	2024 strikes. State capacity near-collapsed. Beirut port — regional logistics hub — disrupted (UNCTAD 2024).	●
Sudan	ACTIVE	Civil War	National EOC destroyed. 7.7M internally displaced (UNHCR 2025). Wheat collapse → Levant food inflation.	●
Iraq	ELEVATED	Proxy Conflict	Basra terminal: 3.5M bbl/day (IEA). Militia activity. Any disruption = immediate Brent price spike.	
Iran	ELEVATED	State Actor	6 Hormuz closure threats since 2011 (US EIA). Direct Israel exchanges Apr & Oct 2024.	●
Syria	ELEVATED	Post-Conflict	Post-Assad transition Dec 2024. Northern corridor — Iraq–Turkey route — contested (UN OCHA Dec 2024).	●
Libya	ELEVATED	Fragile State	Controls 3% global oil supply (IEA). Dual-government. Tripoli port intermittent.	

1.2

30-MONTH TIMELINE — HOW WE GOT HERE


Ten documented events. Each independently sourced. Cumulative effect: a region in permanent compound crisis.

1  Oct 2023 Gaza conflict begins Israel–Hamas war erupts following Oct 7 attacks. Regional escalation cycle begins. Source: UN OCHA / Reuters	2  Nov 2023 Houthi Red Sea campaign starts First missile/drone attacks on commercial shipping in Bab-el-Mandeb strait. Source: U.S. Navy / CENTCOM	3  Jan 2024 Maersk, MSC suspend Red Sea transit Major carriers reroute via Cape of Good Hope. Aqaba volumes drop 18% month-on-month. Source: Maersk / Reuters	4  Feb 2024 Red Sea cable cuts (HGW-1, AAE-1, Seacom) Internet backbone severed. 25% of Asia–Europe traffic affected for 8+ months. Source: Submarine Cable Map / TeleGeography	5  Apr 2024 UAE flash floods + Iran–Israel direct exchange 254mm rain in 24hrs (Dubai). Same month: first direct Iran–Israel missile exchange in history. Sources: UAE NCM / Reuters, IDF
6  Aug 2024 Hezbollah–Israel escalation Cross-border strikes intensify. Beirut port operations disrupted through Q3 2024. Source: UNIFIL / Reuters	7  Oct 2024 Second Iran–Israel exchange Direct strikes on Iranian soil. Oil markets spike 5% intraday (Brent). Source: Reuters / AP	8  Dec 2024 Assad regime falls in Syria Post-conflict transition begins. Northern Jordan border security posture elevated. Source: Reuters	9  2025 Aqaba congestion persists Average vessel wait time +6 days vs 2022 baseline (Jordan Ports Corp Q4 2025). Source: Jordan Ports Corporation	10  2026 Compound risk becomes baseline Multiple simultaneous disruptions are now the operating norm, not the exception. Source: ACLED / WTO / CSET (Composite)

Five years ago, any ONE of these would have been the year's defining risk story. Today, all ten have occurred within 30 months.

1.3 HOW CONFLICT CASCADES INTO JORDAN

Jordan is not adjacent to the crisis — Jordan is inside every cascade simultaneously




Jordan is the only country in the world simultaneously absorbing all five of these cascades. This is the baseline — not a crisis state.

Source: World Bank Jordan Economic Monitor 2025; UNHCR Jordan; CBJ Annual Report 2024; NEPCO Annual Report 2023

PART TWO

Hormuz & Red Sea Crisis

Two maritime chokepoints under simultaneous threat — and Jordan sits at the end of both



2.1

STRAIT OF HORMUZ — 33km WIDE, ZERO DEEP-WATER ALTERNATIVES

The chokepoint that controls 21% of the world's oil — and the DR implications no one is modeling

21%

Global oil supply
in daily transit

20%

Global LNG trade
by volume

17M

Barrels per day
transiting

33km

Narrowest point
of the strait

0

Deep-water
alternative routes

PARTIAL CLOSURE — Current Risk Level

- IRGCN mined Hormuz twice: 1984 and 1987–88 Tanker War. Capability documented. (US EIA)
- 6 formal Iranian closure threats since 2011 — twice with naval deployments. (CSIS Maritime Tracker)
- Any partial closure triggers 40–80% global oil price spike within 72hrs. (IEA War Scenario Model 2024)
- Jordan's fuel import chain disrupted within 72 hours. No strategic reserve held. (Ministry of Energy Jordan)
- Amman hospital generator autonomy: 72 hours. Closure lasts weeks to months. (JHA Survey 2023)

FULL CLOSURE — Tail Risk, Non-Zero

- 2019 tanker attacks (Fujairah, Gulf of Oman) showed direct maritime warfare willingness. (US Navy 5th Fleet)
- 30-day closure drains global strategic petroleum reserves to critical floor. (IEA Emergency Response)
- GCC power grids — incl. Jordan's import dependency — face systemic failure within 2 weeks. (NEPCO)
- Jordan's entire fuel import chain halts. No Hormuz = no energy security. (Ministry of Energy Jordan 2024)
- Water treatment plants in northern Jordan: 4-day diesel reserves. (WAJ Operations Report 2024)

DR IMPLICATIONS — For This Room

- 72-hour generator autonomy is a DR liability. 30-day reserve = Jordan benchmark. (ISO 22301)
- Hospital and water utility DR plans must include Hormuz scenario. Currently absent. (JHA, WAJ 2024)
- Generator fuel contracts must include price-shock escalation and priority delivery clauses.
- Energy supply disruption = standalone BCP scenario — not a footnote under 'utilities'. (ISO 22301)
- Every organisation without a Hormuz model has an incomplete DR plan.

RED SEA SHIPPING CRISIS — THE NUMBERS THAT DEFINE JORDAN'S SUPPLY CHAIN

From November 2023: the world's most important trade corridor became a conflict zone

500%+

Spot freight rate increase
Shanghai→Rotterdam 2023→2024

70%

Drop in Red Sea container
shipments Nov 2023–Mar 2024

30%

Global container traffic
rerouted via Cape of Good Hope

+14

Days added to Asia–Europe
shipping journey (each voyage)

\$1M+

Additional fuel cost per
voyage via Cape rerouting

100+

Vessels attacked by Houthi
forces to June 2025


JO Jordan: Operational Impact of the Red Sea Crisis

Aqaba congestion +40% (Jordan Ports Corp, Jan 2024) · Fuel import costs +35–55% (Ministry of Energy Jordan 2024) · Pharmaceutical lead times +30–45 days (Jordan Pharmacists Assoc 2024) · Wheat import inflation +22% (Jordan DOS 2024) · Infrastructure project overruns +20–40% (MoPIC Jordan 2024)

Average vessel wait at Aqaba: +6 days vs 2022 (Jordan Ports Corp Q4 2025) — the clearest leading indicator of regional supply chain stress.

2.3 FREIGHT COST SHOCK — SECTOR BY SECTOR, JORDAN 2023–2024

How the Red Sea crisis becomes an operational DR problem across every sector



Average import cost increase by sector, Jordan 2023–2024 (%)

Energy +55%

Fuel cost inflation increases DR operating costs the moment a crisis starts. Generator runtime is no longer budgeted correctly.

Pharma +48%

Jordan hospital DR budgets have not absorbed this. 60-day medical buffer stocks now prohibitively expensive — yet mandatory under ISO 22301.

Construction +38%

Capital works to upgrade DR infrastructure face 38% cost overruns. DR programmes deferred.

Consumer +35%

Margin pressure competes directly with DR investment precisely when risk is highest.

PART THREE

Jordan's Operational Exposure

Six infrastructure vulnerabilities — every figure sourced, every gap documented

3.1

JORDAN'S CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE — SIX VULNERABILITIES, ZERO REDUNDANCY

Aqaba Port

100% of seaborne imports — sole maritime gateway. Red Sea crisis adds 14+ days per vessel. Congestion +40% (Jordan Ports Corp, Jan 2024). A physical incident or sustained Houthi threat is a national supply emergency with no alternative route.

Source: Jordan Ports Corp Operational Report, Jan 2024

Water Infrastructure

World's 2nd most water-scarce country (FAO 2024). Northern governorates at 132% of designed capacity (WAJ 2024). Irbid and Mafraq on permanent rationing. A single stress event triggers system-wide failure.

Source: WAJ Annual Report 2024; FAO AQUASTAT Jordan 2024

Power Grid

~95% energy imported, primarily via Aqaba (NEPCO 2023). Northern grid at 145% of pre-2011 demand baseline. Load-shedding structural. Any infrastructure incident cascades across the refugee-dense northern corridor.

Source: NEPCO Annual Report 2023; Ministry of Energy Jordan 2024

Healthcare System

Irbid, Mafraq, Zarqa hospitals at 120–140% capacity (JHA 2024). Mass-casualty surge capacity: zero. Pharmaceutical lead times +30–45 days due to Red Sea rerouting (Jordan Pharmacists Assoc 2024).

Source: Jordan Hospital Association Capacity Report 2024; JPA Supply Chain Survey 2024

Telecommunications

HGW-1 and AAE-1 cable cuts (Feb 2024) directly degraded Jordanian internet by 35–40ms added latency (TRC 2024). No national SATCOM backup mandate. Mobile network = primary crisis comms channel.

Source: TRC Jordan Quarterly Telecom Report Q1 2024; Telegeography Cable Map 2024

Banking & Finance

CBJ Instructions No. 5/2021 mandate quarterly DR testing. Compliance below 60% among licensed institutions (CBJ Supervision Report 2024). Cross-border transaction infrastructure shares Red Sea cable dependency.

Source: CBJ Supervision & Examination Dept Annual Report 2024

3.2

REFUGEE BURDEN — PERMANENT STRUCTURAL STRAIN ON JORDAN'S EMERGENCY CAPACITY

Not a temporary condition. A documented operational baseline every DR plan must be calibrated against.

3.0M+

Total refugee & displaced population in Jordan

Source: UNHCR, 2025

#1

Highest refugee per-capita burden globally

Source: UNHCR Global Trends, 2025

29%

Of Jordan's total population is non-Jordanian

Source: DOS Jordan Census Estimate 2025

Water

132% of designed system capacity (WAJ 2024)

Northern governorates on permanent rationing. Emergency distribution is the structural baseline. Any single infrastructure incident fails the system for 3M+ people.

Health

120–140% occupancy; surge capacity = 0 (JHA 2024)

Irbid, Mafraq and Zarqa hospitals have zero mass-casualty surge capacity. Pharmaceutical lead times already extended +30–45 days.

Power

145% of pre-2011 demand baseline (NEPCO 2023)

Northern grid load-shedding is structural. Any infrastructure incident — or Hormuz-driven fuel shortage — cascades across a 30% larger population than the grid was built for.

Emergency Services

Response times +40% in refugee areas (Civil Defence 2024)

Civil defence assets serve a 30% larger population with the same 2010 inventory. Simultaneous multi-site incidents exceed total capacity.

PART FOUR

Aqaba Deep Dive

Jordan's single point of failure — incident by incident, with named operators and exact figures

4.1 AQABA PORT — INCIDENT LOG 2023–2025

Five documented disruptions in 24 months. This is the trend line, not the exception.

Date	Event	Operational Impact
Dec 2023	First major reroute by carriers	Maersk and MSC suspend direct Red Sea calls. Aqaba transshipment volumes fall 18% MoM (Jordan Ports Corp Q4 2023).
Feb 2024	Cable cuts disrupt port IT systems	HGW-1/AAE-1 cable severance causes 6-hour customs clearance system outage at Aqaba Container Terminal (TRC Jordan).
Jun 2024	Average wait time crosses +5 days	Vessel queuing at Aqaba reaches record levels. Cold-chain (pharma, food) cargo spoilage incidents reported (JPA, Jordan Customs).
Sep 2024	Fuel price pass-through to freight	Inland trucking costs Aqaba–Amman rise 27% YoY, driven by marine fuel surcharge pass-through (JCI Logistics Survey 2024).
Q4 2025	Wait time stabilises at +6 days	New operating baseline established. Jordan Ports Corp confirms congestion is now structural, not transient (JPC Q4 2025 Report).

Five distinct, independently-reported incidents in 24 months. The pattern is escalating, not stabilising.

Source: Jordan Ports Corporation Quarterly Operations Reports 2023–2025; Lloyd's List; Reuters

4.2

AQABA CLOSURE SCENARIO — QUANTIFYING THE 30-DAY EXPOSURE

If Aqaba closed completely for 30 days, what would actually happen — sector by sector?

Days 1–3	Days 4–10	Days 11–30
— Fuel: Strategic reserves begin drawdown. No published national reserve target exists. — Hospitals: Generator fuel autonomy (72hrs) reaches critical threshold in Irbid, Mafrqa, Zarqa. — Markets: Import-dependent retail sees immediate price volatility.	— Power: NEPCO begins coordinated load-shedding in northern corridor — affecting 1.2M+ residents. — Water: WAJ pumping stations on diesel backup face fuel allocation conflicts with hospitals and grid. — Pharma: Critical medicine shortages begin in oncology, dialysis and insulin supply chains (JPA estimate).	— Food: Wheat flour reserves (60–90 day buffer) approach minimum threshold — bakery price controls likely triggered. — Industry: Manufacturing reliant on imported inputs begins partial shutdowns. — Macro: Jordan's import bill is ~40% of GDP (World Bank) — a 30-day halt is a measurable GDP-quarter shock.

This is not a worst-case scenario — it is the direct, modelled consequence of Jordan's existing single-port dependency, applied to documented 2024 baseline figures.

Source: Modelled by author based on: Jordan Ports Corp 2024; Ministry of Energy Jordan 2024; WAJ 2024; JHA 2024; Jordan DOS Trade Stats 2024

PART FIVE

DR Principles & Regional Gaps

The fundamentals — and the six things the MENA region is consistently getting wrong

5.1

THE DR VOCABULARY — SIX TERMS REQUIRING BOARD-LEVEL DECISIONS

These are not IT configuration parameters. They are strategic choices that belong in this room.

Term	Full Name	What it means — and why it belongs in this room
BIA	<i>Business Impact Analysis</i>	Maps mission-critical processes and the cost of their failure. Every BIA in Jordan must include a Hormuz disruption and Aqaba closure scenario as baseline inputs — not edge cases.
RTO	<i>Recovery Time Objective</i>	Maximum tolerable downtime. A board decision, not an IT number. Jordan benchmark: 4 hrs for financial systems (CBJ Inst. 5/2021). Must be validated against compound failure.
RPO	<i>Recovery Point Objective</i>	Maximum acceptable data loss, measured in time. The 2024 Red Sea cable cuts proved RPO validation must include physical connectivity path analysis.
MTPD	<i>Max Tolerable Disruption Period</i>	The absolute outer limit before organisational survival is threatened. For energy-dependent Jordan operations during a Hormuz closure, MTPD is hours — not days.
DR Site	<i>Alternate Recovery Site</i>	Hot, warm or cold. Jordan requirement: outside northern corridor, outside shared cable dependency zone, with 30-day independent fuel/water autonomy.
BCM	<i>Business Continuity Management</i>	The governing discipline. DR is the response-and-restoration subset. A BCM framework excluding Hormuz and Red Sea scenarios is incomplete as of Nov 2023.

5.2

SIX CRITICAL GAPS — DIAGNOSTIC FINDINGS FROM 20+ YEARS OF MENA I ASSESSMENT

All six gaps are documented in Jordan. All six are solvable.

• CRITICAL

No compound-scenario planning

DR plans target single events. Jordan faces cyber + physical + shipping + energy shock simultaneously. No organisation assessed has a compound-scenario DR framework. (Deloitte BCM Survey 2024)

• CRITICAL

Plans exist. Testing does not.

Fewer than 28% of MENA organisations conducted a full DR simulation in the past 24 months. (Deloitte BCM Survey 2024). An untested plan creates false confidence.

• HIGH

Supply chain DR is absent

Organisations assume critical vendors are resilient. In a shipping crisis, Tier-2 and Tier-3 suppliers collapse first. The Red Sea crisis exposed this at scale.

• HIGH

DR sites chosen without conflict logic

Alternate sites chosen for technical convenience. Jordan requirement: outside northern corridor, outside cable dependency, 30-day fuel/water autonomy. Most sites meet none.

• HIGH

DR is treated as an IT function

Finance, HR, Procurement, Communications fail first in a crisis. When excluded from DR scope, recovery is structurally incomplete. (PwC MENA Resilience 2025)

• MEDIUM

DR investment is reactive

Budgets follow incidents. With freight costs up 500% and DR infrastructure costs up 38%, the case for pre-crisis investment has never been stronger — or more deferred.

PART SIX

Emergency Operations Centres

Structure, activation, documented failures and the principles that separate the resilient

6.1

EMERGENCY OPERATIONS CENTRES — ANATOMY AND JORDAN'S THREE-TIER REALITY

An EOC is not a room with screens. It is a pre-approved governance structure with defined authority.

- **Command & Control**
Pre-defined decision authority. Activation threshold, escalation path and spending limits approved before any event.
- **Situational Awareness**
Single common operating picture. All participants see the same real-time data simultaneously.
- **Communications Hub**
Internal/external comms, media management, inter-agency liaison. Must function when primary telecoms fail.
- **Resource & Logistics**
Fuel allocation, medical supply, personnel deployment. In a Hormuz/Red Sea scenario this is the most critical function.
- **External Liaison**
Civil defence, military, telecoms, international agencies. Relationships must exist before the crisis.
- **Logging & Reporting**
Real-time incident log, regulatory reporting, post-event reconstruction — basis of every improvement cycle.

JORDAN'S THREE-TIER EOC STRUCTURE

TIER 1 — National Government

Example: NCSCPD, Civil Defence HQ, Crisis Cabinet

Strategic coordination, inter-ministry, international liaison, national resource declaration.

Gap: Activation lag: 6–12 hours average. No Hormuz/Red Sea supply shock protocol exists. (NCSCPD Review 2023)

TIER 2 — Sectoral / Infrastructure

Example: CBJ Crisis Room, NEPCO Grid Control, MoH Emergency Unit, Aqaba Port Authority

Sector-specific response. System continuity. Reports to national EOC.

Gap: Critical gap: Aqaba Port Authority and NEPCO have no real-time coordination protocol. (NEPCO/APC Joint Review 2024)

TIER 3 — Organisational / Corporate

Example: Hospital command centres, bank crisis teams, corporate EOCs

Operational continuity, employee safety, stakeholder communications, asset protection.

Gap: Most Tier 3 EOCs in Jordan are informal, undocumented, key-person dependent. (CBJ Supervision 2024)

FOUR DOCUMENTED EOC FAILURES — WHAT THE REGION ACTUALLY TEACHES

Real events. Structural failures. Lessons that apply directly to Jordan.

Beirut Explosion · August 2020

No unified EOC. Multiple agencies competed for authority for 72 hours. International aid uncoordinated for 96 hours. WhatsApp became the de facto command channel. 200+ dead, 6,000+ injured.

→ **Command authority must be pre-defined and rehearsed. Ambiguity in the first hour determines the outcome of the first week.**

Source: UN OCHA Lebanon Flash Appeal, Aug 2020

UAE Flash Floods · April 2024

254mm rain in 24 hours — UAE's highest recorded. Dubai airport: 18-hour recovery vs 4-hour RTO. Zero inter-emirate EOC coordination activated. WhatsApp served as the public's primary information source.

→ **Climate scenario baselines in MENA are obsolete. Jordan's flash flood risk in Petra, Wadi Rum and Zarqa Valley is systematically underplanned.**

Source: NCEMA UAE After-Action Review, May 2024; WMO Regional Bulletin Apr 2024

Sudan Civil War · 2023–present

Sudan's national EOC was physically located in Khartoum — which became the primary conflict zone. No alternate site existed. National emergency coordination collapsed entirely for several weeks.

→ **A single-site EOC is a single point of failure. Jordan's northern corridor concentration of EOC infrastructure carries the same vulnerability.**

Source: UN OCHA Sudan Situation Reports, May–Aug 2023

Red Sea Cable Cuts · February 2024

HGW-1, AAE-1 and Seacom severed. 25% of Asia–Europe internet traffic affected for 8+ months. Multiple Jordanian financial institutions discovered their cloud DR relied on the same physical cable paths.

→ **Cloud infrastructure is only as resilient as its physical connectivity layer. Logical separation on the same cable route is not DR redundancy.**

Source: TeleGeography Cable Disruption Report, Mar 2024; TRC Jordan Q1 2024

SIX PRINCIPLES OF HIGH-PERFORMING EOCs — GROUNDED IN REGIONAL EVIDENCE



What separates organisations that absorb crises from those consumed by them

01 Pre-define authority — before you need it

Who declares a crisis? Who authorises fuel rationing? Who speaks to media? This matrix must be board-approved, distributed and rehearsed annually. (ISO 22361 §6.3)

02 Activate at 30 minutes — not 6 hours

MENA organisations activate EOCs 6+ hours after a triggering event on average. Best practice: 30 minutes. Activation is preparation, not declaration. (FEMA 2023)

03 One common operating picture for all

All EOC participants must see the same real-time data simultaneously. One dashboard, one source of truth. Non-negotiable.

04 Alternate EOC — 30-day autonomous, outside the corridor

Jordan's northern corridor EOC concentration is a documented single point of failure. Alternate site must carry 30-day independent fuel/water. (World Bank Jordan DRM 2024)

05 Simulate compound scenarios — not comfortable ones

Annual exercises must simulate multi-system failure: no fuel deliveries, degraded comms, hospital at capacity, Aqaba congested — simultaneously.

06 Build all external relationships before the crisis

NEPCO, Aqaba Port Authority, CBJ, Orange Jordan, civil defence: established in peacetime. An EOC making introductions during a crisis will fail. (ISO 22361 §7.4)

PART SEVEN

Scenarios, Tools & Reconstruction

Recalibrated scenarios, recent cyber incidents, technology toolkit and closing framework

RECALIBRATE YOUR SCENARIOS — THE LEGACY LIBRARY IS DANGEROUSLY OUTDATED

Every scenario on the left was written for a different operating environment. Every scenario on the right reflects today.

LEGACY SCENARIO LIBRARY ✕

✕ Single data centre outage

✕ Ransomware attack — isolated system

✕ Flash flood — localised, 1–2 hours

✕ Power outage — 4 to 8 hours

✕ Key staff member unavailable

✕ Supplier delivery delay — measured in days

CONFLICT-ERA SCENARIO LIBRARY ✓

✓ **Cyber + physical + logistics shock — simultaneous**

Source: Deloitte BCM Survey 2024

✓ **State-sponsored APT during regional conflict escalation**

Source: NCSCPD Jordan 2024

✓ **Multi-day flood: Zarqa Valley, Petra corridor, Desert Highway**

Source: JMD Flash Flood Risk Map 2024

✓ **Grid failure — 72+ hours under Hormuz-driven fuel disruption**

Source: NEPCO Contingency Review 2023

✓ **Mass staff displacement due to conflict proximity to N. Jordan**

Source: UNHCR/DOS Jordan 2025

✓ **Aqaba port closure — 2 to 4 weeks, no alternative route**

Source: Jordan Ports Corp Risk Register 2024

7.2 RECENT CYBER INCIDENTS TARGETING MENA CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE

Named, dated, attributed where publicly confirmed — the cyber dimension of the compound threat

HIGH

2022

ADNOC (UAE)

Energy

OT-network intrusion attempt detected and contained. Part of a broader pattern of state-linked reconnaissance against Gulf energy infrastructure (Recorded Future).

HIGH

2023

Multiple GCC Banks

Finance

Coordinated phishing campaign attributed to financially-motivated group targeting SWIFT-adjacent payment infrastructure across 4 GCC states (CrowdStrike 2025).

MEDIUM

2023–24

Jordanian Government Entities

Public Sector

Increase in spear-phishing campaigns against Jordanian ministries, timed to coincide with regional conflict escalation events (CBJ Cybersecurity Report 2024).

HIGH

2024

Regional Telecom Operators

Telecom

Multiple GCC and Levant telecom operators report DDoS attacks coinciding with Red Sea cable disruption period — compounding existing connectivity stress (TRC regional bulletin).

CRITICAL

2024

Saudi & UAE Critical Infrastructure

Multi-sector

Mandiant attributes sustained APT activity (suspected Iran-linked) against energy, government and logistics targets across the Gulf — consistent with pre-positioning for conflict contingencies (Mandiant M-Trends 2025).

The compound threat is not theoretical: cyber operations are demonstrably timed to coincide with physical and logistics disruptions in the region.

Source: CrowdStrike Global Threat Report 2025; Recorded Future MENA Threat Bulletin 2024; CBJ Cybersecurity Report 2024; Mandiant M-Trends 2025

The question is not whether disruption will come.

It is whether your organisation will absorb it, continue operating through it, and recover without it becoming an existential event.

*The shipping lanes are already disrupted.
The chokepoints are already under threat.
The only variable left is your state of readiness.*

Jordan is not at the edge of this crisis. Jordan is at its center. The DR frameworks in this room must be built for that reality — starting today.

Seven Sourced Take-Aways



1. Eight conflict theatres, 30 months of escalation

ACLED 2026

2. Hormuz & Red Sea are your supply chain today

US EIA / UNCTAD 2024

3. Aqaba: 5 incidents in 24 months, escalating

Jordan Ports Corp 23–25

4. Six sourced Jordan vulnerabilities, zero coverage

WAJ / NEPCO / JHA 2024

5. Compound scenarios incl. cyber are the gap

Deloitte / Mandiant 24-25

6. EOC speed + 30-day fuel autonomy: two gaps

ISO 22361 / JHA 2024

7. Test harder than you expect. Then harder.

ISO 22301 §8.5